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and determined that the purpose of the
statute was to eliminate uncertainty
about when the statute of limitations
begins to run in cases such as Rosser's.
The court reasoned that if the limitations period did not begin to run until
the taxpayer actually received notice,
the date triggering the limitations period would remain an uncertainty, and
thus inconsistent with Section
6532(a)(1)'s purpose.
Finally, the court observed the practical considerations of the two-year statute of limitations under Section
6532(a)(1). Requiring the IRS to prove
a taxpayer's actual receipt of a disallowance notice in order to trigger the
statute of limitations would be impractical. In addition, giving taxpayers the
opportunity to deny receipt of disallowance notices would further delay the
statute of limitations period.
IRS could assert limitations statute
The 11th Circuit also held that the
district court erred in relying on cases
applying equitable estoppel against the
federal government. The district court
found that the actions the IRS took on
Rosser' s refiled claims tolled the statute
of limitations, and that the January 23,
1989, notice of disallowance the IRS
sent Rosser in response to his refiled
claims "stated on its face without reservation or condition that plaintiff had
two years from [the date the second
notice was mailed] to file suit." The
11th Circuit, however, rejected the district court's conclusion. The appellate
court posited that the January 23, 1989,
notice contained no language which
could have led Rosser to believe that he
had two years from the date of this
notice to file his claim, nor did this
notice contain any other language which
could have misled Rosser. Finally, the
11th Circuit found no other bases for the
lower court to have employed the doctrine of equitable estoppel and, therefore, denied its application.
-Mona Dajani

Volume 6 Number 4 / Summer 1994

Texas Supreme
Court sets punitive
damages standards
In TransportationInsuranceCo. v.
Moriel, 1994 WL 246568 (Tex.), the
Supreme Court of Texas clarified standards governing the imposition of punitive damages awards in bad faith insurance cases. The court held that insurers
will be liable for punitive damages only
if bad faith is accompanied by gross
negligence. In addition, the court explained what a plaintiff must show to
establish gross negligence, and announced new procedural standards for
punitive damages awards. The court
required courts to separate the determination of the amount of punitive damages from the other issues at trial, and
mandated that courts of appeals which
review the factual sufficiency of punitive damages awards explain why the
evidence does or does not support the
award.
Insurance carrierdelays paying bills
In March 1986, Juan Moriel was
injured when a stack of countertops fell
on him. He sustained fractures of the
wrist, pelvis, and ribs. Transportation
Insurance Company (Transportation),
Moriel' s employer's workers' compensation carrier, paid his hospitalization
costs. Several days after his discharge
from the hospital, Moriel experienced
periods in which he was unable to move
his leg. He returned to the hospital for
testing. Six weeks following his accident, Moriel discovered he was impotent. After tests conducted in El Paso
revealed no physical cause for the impotence and hormone therapy failed to
cure the problem, doctors advised Moriel
to undergo additional testing at a Houston hospital. Doctors in Houston found
Moriel's impotence to be at least partially physical. They also recommended
that Moriel seek counseling for emotional problems. Moriel did so and even-

tually was able to resume sexual relations with his wife.
Transportation delayed paying four
of Moriel' s bills. The company received
a $3,155 bill for Moriel's Houston tests
in November 1986. Although Transportation had authorized the tests in
advance, it did not pay Moriel's bill for
more than two years, on the ground that
Moriel's impotence was unrelated to
his work injury. Second, Transportation delayed paying Moriel's $2,075
psychiatric counseling bill for more than
a year, claiming that it had never received the psychiatrist's report. Third,
the company delayed paying a $382.25
bill for outpatient testing. It paid only
after the hospital filed a collection action against Moriel. Finally, Transportation did not pay the bill for the El Paso
tests until after Moriel filed his lawsuit.
Evidence indicated, however, that because the El Paso company had mailed
the bill to the wrong address, Transportation did not receive it until after the
lawsuit commenced.
While he was undergoing testing and
treatment, Moriel filed a workers' compensation claim against Transportation.
In July 1987, he received an award of
$30,022.77 from the Industrial Accident Board. When Transportation appealed, Moriel counterclaimed for additional compensation, unpaid medical
bills, and bad faith claims practices. In
July 1988, Moriel and Transportation
settled the workers' compensation
claim.
At the trial on the bad faith claim, the
jury found that Transportation had no
reasonable basis to delay paying
Moriel's medical bills, and that Transportation had "acted with heedless and
reckless disregard" of Moriel's rights.
The jury awarded Moriel $1,000 in actual damages, $100,000 in mental anguish damages, and $1 million in punitive damages. The trial court entered
judgment on the verdict, and denied
Transportation's motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur,
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and a new trial. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision.
Court rulespunitive damages not
precludedby Workers' Compensation settlement
The partial judgment setting forth
the settlement of the workers' compensation claim stated that the extent of
injury and liability for compensation or
medical expenses was uncertain. Transportation argued that this statement prevented the trial court from finding conscious indifference on Transportation's
part. The company claimed that because of this, Moriel's right to pursue a
claim for punitive damages was extinguished.
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed.
The court found the partial judgment to
indicate only that Transportation's total
liability was uncertain. The statement
did not constitute a finding that
Transportation's liability for any or every medical bill was uncertain. In addition, Moriel' s bad faith contentions were
primarily related to the delay in paying
the bills. Furthermore, the court found
that the partial judgment expressly preserved Moriel's bad faith and punitive
damages claims.
The Texas Supreme Court began its
analysis of Moriel's punitive damages
claim by explaining the difference between punitive and compensatory damages. Compensatory damages are
awarded to make a plaintiff "whole" for
losses incurred as a result of the
defendant's interference with the
plaintiff's rights. Punitive damages, on
the other hand, are awarded "to punish
the defendant for outrageous, malicious,
or otherwise morally culpable conduct."
In addition, unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are a private
windfall to the recipient. Punitive damages therefore require safeguards to
minimize the risk that a defendant will
be punished excessively or unjustly.
The supreme court next examined
the relationship of a claim for punitive
damages with underlying claims for
130

breach of contract and bad faith. The
court noted that a bad faith case may
involve claims for three types of damages: 1) benefit of the bargain damages
for a breach of contract claim; 2) compensatory damages for the tort claim of
bad faith; and 3) punitive damages for
intentional, fraudulent, malicious, or
grossly negligent conduct.
Bad faith occurs when a breach of
contract is accompanied by an independent tort. One may not establish a bad
faith claim merely by showing that there
is a dispute about an insurer's liability
on a contract. In addition, bad faith is
not established when a jury having the
benefit of hindsight decides that the
insurer was wrong about the factual
basis for denying the claim, or wrong in
its interpretation of its policy. To prove
a claim of bad faith, the plaintiff must
establish that the insurer had no reasonable basis for denying a claim or delaying payment of it, and that the insurer
knew or should have known it had no
such basis.
The court maintained that even if the
insurer had no reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment on the claim,
the plaintiff may not recover punitive
damages on that basis alone. Bad faith
on the part of an insurer justifies an
award solely for compensatory damages. Punitive damages are appropriate
only when bad faith is accompanied by
fraudulent, malicious, intentional, or
grossly negligent conduct.
Courtfinds punitive damages
inappropriatein this case
The court next analyzed whether
Moriel's evidence sufficiently supported
his claim for punitive damages. First,
the court examined the definition of
gross negligence. The Texas Legislature defined gross negligence as "more
than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error ofjudgment. It means
such an entire want of care as to establish that the act or omission was the
result of actual conscious indifference
to the rights, safety, or welfare of the

person affected." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. §41.001(5) (Vernon Supp.
1994). The court stated that gross negligence has two components: 1) the
defendant's act or omission; and 2) the
defendant's mental state.
A finding of gross negligence is warranted only if the evidence indicates
that the act was likely to result in serious
harm and that the defendant was consciously indifferent to the risk of harm.
Conscious indifference may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, the court declared
that in deciding whether a defendant's
act or omission involved a risk of serious harm, the trier of fact must view
events from the defendant's viewpoint
at the time the events occurred. A
defendant's behavior, which at the time
of its occurrence appeared to create no
great danger, will not lead to an award
of punitive damages even if grave injuries result.
The court next applied the rules concerning gross negligence to bad faith
insurance disputes. It articulated that it
is bad faith, but not gross negligence,
for an insurer to delay or refuse payment of a claim, even when there is no
reasonable basis for doing so. An insurer will be liable for punitive damages only if bad faith is accompanied by
gross negligence. An award of punitive
damages is justified if it is shown that
the insurer was actually aware that its
action would likely lead to harm that is
not ordinarily associated with breach of
contract or the bad faith denial of a
claim. Examples of such harm include:
death, grievous physical injury, or a
genuine likelihood of financial catastrophe.
After applying these two concepts to
Moriel's case, the court determined that
the lower court's award of punitive damages to Moriel was inappropriate. Transportation had conceded that the evidence supported the jury's conclusion
that it acted without any reasonable
basis and was therefore liable for bad
faith. The court held, however, that
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Transportation was not grossly negligent. To establish gross negligence,
Moriel was required to prove that 1)
Transportation's actions created a genuine and unjustifiable likelihood that serious harm would befall him; and 2)
Transportation was actually aware of
this risk. The court found that the evidence supported neither contention.
The only harm that Moriel suffered
as a result of Transportation's delay in
payment was the anxiety of knowing
that his bills were not paid until the
hospital filed a collection action. Though
Moriel's anxiety was legitimate, it did
not constitute the serious harm required
to justify the award of punitive damages. In addition, the court found that
even if Moriel had shown serious harm,
he failed to introduce any evidence indicating that Transportation was aware
of the probability of it occurring. The
court remanded the case for a new trial
because the trial in this case occurred
before the Texas Supreme Court addressed the standards governing punitive damages in bad faith cases.
Court announces new procedural
standardsfor punitive damages
awards
The supreme court continued its clarification of Texas law by announcing
procedural standards to be applied to all
punitive damages cases. In doing so, the
court articulated a goal of ensuring that
punitive damages awards "are not
grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the offense and have some understandable relationship to compensatory
damages." In announcing two changes
to the procedures by which punitive
damages may be sought, the court expressed its belief that the new standards
would enhance the fairness and predictability of punitive damage awards, and
eliminate some of the arbitrariness of
the former system.
First, the court noted that evidence
of a defendant's net worth is generally
relevant only to the issue of the amount
of punitive damages to be awarded.
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However, the court recognized that such
evidence has the potential to prejudice
juries in their determination of other
issues in tort cases. Therefore, the court
concluded that trial courts, if presented
with timely motions, should separate
the determination of the amount of punitive damages to be awarded from the
other issues in the trial. Using this approach, a jury would first hear evidence
relevant to a defendant's liability for
actual damages, the amount of actual
damages, and liability for punitive damages. Only if the jury found the defendant liable for punitive damages, would
it then be allowed to hear evidence
relevant to the amount to be awarded to
the plaintiff.
Second, the court emphasized that
appellate courts must carefully scrutinize punitive damages awards to ensure
that such awards are supported by the
evidence. The court had previously held
that when reversing a punitive damages
award on grounds of insufficient evidence, the court of appeals was required
to explain in detail the evidence and its
reasons for finding the award erroneous. The Texas Supreme Court stated
that a similar type of review was appropriate when affirming punitive damages awards. As a result, it now requires
courts of appeals conducting factual
sufficiency reviews of punitive damages awards to detail relevant evidence
in their opinions and explain why the
evidence does or does not support the
punitive damages award.
The court then addressed the question of whether trial courts should also
be required to articulate reasons for
upholding or refusing to uphold punitive damages awards. The court recognized that such a practice would facilitate post-verdict review of punitive
damages awards, and urged that such
findings be made to the extent feasible.
It declined to require the practice, however, citing severely overworked and
understaffed trial courts.

Concurring justices would broaden
liability
The concurrence argued that the
majority's announcement, that punitive
damages would be appropriate against
an insurance company only in the most
drastic of circumstances, gives insurance companies little incentive to provide care and promptness in processing
claims. The opinion specifically addressed the majority's conclusion that
"an insurance carrier's refusal to pay a
claim cannot justify punishment unless
the insurer was actually aware that its
action would probably result in extraordinary harm not ordinarily associated
with breach of contract or bad faith
denial of a claim." The concurrence
concluded that the practical effect of the
majority's holding would be to eliminate liability for all insurance company
conduct, no matter how morally reprehensible or intentionally harmful. The
concurrence attacked the vagueness of
the term "extraordinary harm," claiming that courts could interpret it in whatever way necessary to achieve the desired outcome. Furthermore, the concurrence criticized the majority for adding the term "extreme degree of risk" to
the definition of gross negligence. The
concurrence argued that in adding this
new twist, the majority took on a role
that is rightly reserved for the legislature.
Additionally, the concurrence criticized the majority for its statements
concerning issues which were not raised
by the parties. While agreeing that it is
prudent to separate the issue of amount
of punitive damages from the rest of the
issues at trial, the concurrence maintained that this issue was not brought
before the court. The same was true for
the issues surrounding bad faith. Transportation did not timely challenge its
liability on this ground, yet the majority
discussed at great length evidentiary
requirements for bad faith claims.
-Caryn R. Suder
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